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Attitudes towards policy regulations of environmental reporting were examined in a survey of 
15 portfolio managers of stock funds lacking an explicit environmental strategy. The 
managers’ evaluated three regulative measures. They were most positive toward requirements 
for companies to report their environmental impacts in a standardized way, a measure that 
also was perceived to have the largest impact on social responsible investment. They were 
less positive toward a requirement for the funds to display in which way they themselves take 
environmental criteria into account in their investments. They were least positive to announce 
the proportion of companies in their portfolios that in a standardized way reports 
environmental performance.     3 
1 Introduction 
Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) is the investor practice to deliberately integrate 
environmental, social and governance aspects for the benefit of society. Investors have 
indirect influence on the environment by, for example, choosing companies in which to buy 
or sell shares and by actively monitoring of the management of the companies.  
 
Buying funds is one of the methods for capital owners to invest in companies. The 
decision to invest indirectly in companies through a fund has implications on the possibilities 
to influence the company and on the availability of information. For example, by the economy 
of scale of a fund, small capital owners form significant actors in the stock market and their 
influence increases. Hence, the interest and need of information may be different when 
investing in a fund compared to investing in companies directly. This may also affect the 
promotion of socially responsible investments. In this report, we examine portfolio managers’ 
attitudes towards environmental reporting. One of the reasons is that the portfolio managers 
constitute a link between actors. Another reason is that they, because of their “intermediate” 
position, are at risk of communicating in an inconsistent way upwards (to capital owners) and 
downwards (to portfolio companies) – the vertical communication. In the following we first 
describe current environmental reporting practice, and then we discuss some consequences of 
being in an “intermediate” position when investing in stocks.  
 
The practice among companies to integrate environmental, social and governance aspects 
is referred to as Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). Fortune Global 250 companies have 
started to offer information and to strive to increase transparency regarding sustainability 
(Kolk, 2006). Among larger companies the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) (2009) has 
reached considerable status as a framework for reporting sustainability. For example, all 
Swedish government-owned companies report in line with GRI since the beginning of 2009. 
However, far from all companies listed on the Swedish stock market report environmental 
data, which hinders common dissemination principles and vertical communication of facts to 
capital owners.  
 
With a good standard of formal corporate governance, shareholders can have a more 
active role, enabling them to express environmental, social and governance concern to 
management. An essential element in corporate governance is transparency (Bandsuch, Pate, 
& Thies, 2008). With transparency formal governance mechanisms can be complemented by 
informal governance mechanism, for example media exposure, trust, reputation and social 
norms in protecting investors (Stafsudd, 2009).  
 
One standpoint for SRI is to commit to Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI ) 
which are a set of global best-practices for responsible investment launched by United 
Nations. Even though investments that can be labelled SRI are increasing (Sparkes & Cowton, 
2004), the majority of Swedish institutional investors have neither signed PRI nor formed 
explicit policies expressing that they will actively support the development toward a 
sustainable society. Hence, they are a potential group for future influence and pressure on the 
environmental development.  
 
Institutional investors are dominant on the Swedish stock market. In reality, this 
heterogeneous group includes both organisations that own capital (e.g., foundations) as well 
as those who take as a mission to invest others’ capital (e.g., banks, pension funds). In this 
second group are both these organisations as well as also the employed individuals, for    4 
example portfolio managers in fund companies. As the saving in funds has increased in 
Sweden during the last decade, portfolio managers in fund companies have an important role 
in promoting SRI. Unfortunately, only a small number of funds reports environmental data. 
Hence, there are limited possibilities for capital owners with sustainability ambitions to invest 
in funds. 
 
Although funds can represent a fracture in the information chain between companies and 
capital owners, they can also take part in the sustainability development. A tendency in recent 
years has been the development of links between SRI and corporate governance system. In 
Europe, UK is leader in the SRI field, and especially pension funds have played a key role in 
the development of SRI (Sparkes, 2002). In Spain, on the other hand, the greatest challenge 
faced by trustees in pension funds is how SRI criteria incorporated into investment policies 
should be applied to portfolio management. For example, lack of knowledge about SRI 
performance has been shown to be high (Albareda & Balaguers, 2009). Hence, funds may act 
as a hinder or a facilitator in both the development toward sustainability and in the 
dissemination of relevant information.  
 
There are also several other groups of stakeholders involved in fund investments. Some 
relationships between the stakeholders are displayed in Figure 1. Asset owners who want to 
invest in a fund make an agreement with the fund company regarding which fund to invest in. 
The portfolio manager that works in the fund company is responsible for the investments of 
the fund according to the fund strategy. The portfolio managers should also provide return on 
the invested capital to fund owners and to report to a fund head. People may hold several 
positions for example, a portfolio manager can also be owner of the fund company.  
 
   
 
 
Figure 1. Main actors and relationships related to funds  
 
There is a principal-agency relationship between the capital owners and the portfolio 
managers of the fund, as the portfolio manager invest on the behalf of the asset owner. Such 
relationship can be defined as a contract under which one or more persons (the principal) 
engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf, which involves 
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company    5 
delegating some decision making authority to the agent.  If both parties are utility maximisers 
there is good reason to believe that the agent will not always act in the best interests of the 
principal. In companies, the problem is caused by the separation of ownership from 
management. The agency problem in companies has been of long concern and much research 
has been devoted to it (e.g., Hansen & Hill, 1991; Hu & Izumida, 2008; Jensen & Meckling, 
1976; Mcknight & Weir, 2009). According to agency theory, management can exploit the 
information asymmetry to act in a manner that is contrary to the interest of the shareholders. 
On the other hand, it is claimed that by appropriate incentives for the agent and a monitoring 
system, the actions of the principal can be controlled (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). One method 
of mitigating the agency problem is to reduce information asymmetry between management 
and shareholders (Donelly & Mulcahy, 2008; Sabherwal & Smith, 2008). Whether there 
actually exist an agency problem in the relationship between capital owners and portfolio 
managers has not been studied. However, there is a risk that portfolio managers maximise 
gains and minimise effort in a not adjusted to SRI. 
 
On the other hand, capital owners and portfolio managers may have reasons to behave 
differently in their role as shareholders of companies. One proposed reason is that institutional 
portfolio managers are under considerable pressure from their organization and their own 
desire for job security and advancement. This has been claimed to lead to risk aversion and 
short-term focus in their investment strategy (Drucker, 1986).  In contrast, Hansen and Hill 
(1991) argue that it is individual investors and not institutions that adopt a short-term 
orientation. This should be due to their inferior level of competence and skill which affects 
the ability to make rational decisions. Since institutions may benefit from economies of scale 
in information-gathering and analyses in combination with that they employ teams of analysts 
and professional decision makers, it is proposed that they are more likely to make rational 
investment decisions than individuals. Still, transparency is needed for capital owners to 
monitor the development of the fund.   
 
To the extent that voluntary commitments to environmental, social and governance 
development is not satisfactory, the government may decide to implement various regulatory 
measures. One measure would be to request public reports of environmental facts from 
companies on stock market. Another measure is to request reports from funds. A higher 
degree of transparency in funds contributes to possibilities to compare funds, to inform 
systematically and to provide means for initiatives and decisions in line with SRI. However, 
do portfolio managers appreciate the positive effects of such governmental regulation?  
 
Even though it is desirable that more funds report their environmental impact, it is 
necessary to clarify if there are important negative side effects of such reports. For example, 
the work to collect, organise and report environmental performance may demand large 
resources. Another aspect that may influence the impact is the initial attitude of portfolio 
managers.  Would they agree to that there are positive effects of environmental reporting even 
if their fund is not specialised as an environmental or SRI fund? In addition, for portfolio 
managers to maintain a positive attitude towards CSR activities, it is advantageous that they 
regard investment in funds as a useful and efficient method to influence environmental 
impacts on society. 
 
In sum, it is valuable that stock companies report their environmental performance and 
that the information is presented for shareholders and intermediate agents such as funds. It is 
valuable that the data is communicated vertically. Otherwise, there is a risk that information is    6 
not used, and the intermediate person is at risk of having one dialogue upwards (towards 
capital owners) and another downwards (towards portfolio companies).  
 
The present study will examine attitudes held by portfolio managers in fund companies 
towards three policy measures that influence environmental reports. The three measures are 
(in the following they will be referred to by the numerals): 
 
1.  The fund company must disclose if and in what way the fund integrates 
environmental facts in their investments. The disclosure can be made by any 
method the company decides suitable.  
2.  All companies in the stock market must report their environmental impact by the 
use of a standardised reporting method for environment, for example Global 
Reporting Initiative (GRI) or another suitable method. 
3.  The fund company must in their annual report include figures for their investments 
concerning the part of their portfolio companies that report environmental impact 
by a standardised method such as GRI. The fund company must report the 
proportion of the portfolio companies that uses standardized reports, as well as 
the proportion of invested capital that is covered by environmental reports in 
companies.  
 
Measure 1 represents a report from the intermediate portfolio manager to capital owners. It 
involves a minimum of policy force. It is based on the condition that the fund lacks 
standardized information available from the companies. The measure is used in the UK for 
pensions funds (Sparkes & Cowton, 2004). Measure 2 gives all people that invest directly in 
company stocks a possibility to follow environmental reporting and performance. Measure 3 
represents vertically integrated information with an intermediate agent. The measure helps the 
fund to report nuances regarding reporting of their portfolio companies for environmental 
issues. Hence, measure 3 can be used independently of whether the fund is proclaimed to be 
“environmental” or has any other focus. 
   
 
2 Method 
The attitudes toward measures for increased environmental reporting were examined in a 
survey. A questionnaire was developed and sent to portfolio managers responsible for stock 
market funds that do not have an explicit environmental strategy. It is this group that would be 
affected by a mandatory policy measure to report environmental figures. 
 
Respondents 
The selection procedure started with identifying Swedish fund companies in which at least 
one fund did not have an explicit environmental strategy. The managing director for each fund 
company was sent a written invitation for the company to participate. In the invitation 
information was given about the research programme. By telephone calls acceptance was 
confirmed and the procedures were settled for how portfolio managers and others within the 
company were to be contacted. Of 35 managing directors, 29 chose to participate, 3 rejected 
the invitation and 3 were not accessible despite repeated efforts to reach them. The 29 
participating companies could request the number of questionnaires they needed depending on 
the number of portfolio managers that were expected to answer the questionnaire. The number 
of delivered questionnaires varied between 1 and 20. Several large fund companies declared 
that they did not want all portfolio managers to participate as this would take up to much of    7 
their time. In all companies, the managing director would contact and motivate employees to 
participate. Hence, the names of the respondents are not known to us. In total, 97 
questionnaires including free-of-charge return envelopes were delivered.   
 
Fifteen useable questionnaires were eventually received. Another 9 questionnaires were 
received from portfolio managers of funds with an explicit environmental strategy. These 
were excluded from the analyses of the results. Among the 15 respondents, 10 work as 
portfolio manager, 3 both as portfolio manager and managing director or fund head and 1 was 
both fund head and a member of the board of the fund company.  
 
Procedure 
The respondents were contacted by their managing director (or someone who represented 
the managing director). The responses were sent directly to us. Repeated reminders were 
directed toward the managing director for all fund companies from which we had not received 
confirmation that they had responded.  
 
The survey was performed between 15th of September and 31st of December 2008, a fall 
with very large financial movements. As a consequence, it was difficult for the respondents to 
prioritize the data collection. This was shown by the problems we had to contact the 
managing directors and difficulties for them to distribute the questionnaires.  
 
Ten people choose to reveal their names to receive feedback in the form of the survey 
results as well as invitation to future seminars in the research programme.  
 
Questionnaire 
A questionnaire (see Appendix) was developed partly using environmental indicators 
from GRI. Shareholder activities were selected in accordance with Mackenzie (2006). Before 
distribution, the questionnaire was sent for comments to several people with knowledge of the 
stock market. The questionnaire had only one version. Hence, the measures were judged in 




Beliefs and attitudes related to SRI 
The respondents were asked to answer the questions with respect to the largest fund for 
which they were responsible. For 5 funds the investment horizon was 1 year, for 2 funds 1.5 
years, for 2 funds 2 years, for 3 funds 4 years, for 2 funds 5 years and for 1 fund 25 years. The 
funds had a medium high level of diversification, which means that they were diversified over 
several sectors. The target for return on investment was reported by 9 funds to be a percentage 
return compared with an index, while 4 funds reported that they had a percentage built on the 
return on invested capital (2 respondents did not answer this question).  
 
Six respondents answered that they very rarely studied environmental information for 
companies that are included or may be included in the fund. Five respondents reported that 
this happened neither rarely nor often and 4 participants indicated that they often studied 
environmental information. No one responded that they studied environmental information 
very often. The benefits for the fund that the respondent studied reports regarding several 
environmental aspects (induced from GRI) were assessed on a scale ranging from ”not at all 
beneficial” (1) through  ”somewhat beneficial” (2) to ”very beneficial” (5). As revealed by    8 
Table 1, “energy usage” and “emissions” were the aspects that on average were evaluated as 
most beneficial and “biological diversity” was evaluated as least beneficial for respondents to 
pay attention to.  
         
Table 1. Means (M) and standard deviations (SD) of ratings of frequency of taking part of 




Energy use  2.83  1.53 
Emissions 2.83  1.40 
Cost for sanctions for non-
compliance with environmental 
regulations 2.67  1.44 
Preventing work against damage  2.58  1.44 
Material usage  2.42  1.44 
Expenditure for environmental 
protection 2.33  1.23 
Waste 2.25  1.42 
Transports’ environmental impact  2.25  1.29 
Water usage  1.83  1.03 
Biological diversity  1.67  0.98 




As revealed by Table 2, the respondents believed that they may influence the environment in 
their role as an institutional investor. In particular, by meeting representatives of the 
companies they experience that they may contribute. At the same time they believed that SRI 
leads to a somewhat lower rate of return of the fund and that more SRI investments would 
have negative effects for themselves in their role as portfolio mangers (see Table 3).  
 
Table 2. Means (M) and standard deviations (SD) of ratings of efficiency of shareholder 
activities in influencing the environmental situation (on a scale from very inefficient (1), 
neither nor (3) to very efficient (5)).  
      
 n  M  SD 
By and sell shares  14  3.21  1.25 
Vote at shareholder meetings  14  4.00  0.55 
Have meetings with 
representatives for portfolio 
companies 15  4.07  0.46 
Have joint activities with other 
owners 15  3.73  1.03 
Take board commissions  13  3.46  0.88 
Search for more information of 
the companies   15  2.87  1.06 
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Table 3. Means (M) and standard deviations (SD) of ratings of statements concerning 
investments with an environmental focus (on a scale ranging from totally reject (1), neither 
nor (3) to agree (5)) (n = 15)). 
    
 M  SD 
    
There is not enough focus on companies’ 
environmental impact among investors.  3.07  1.03 
SRI are asked for by fund owners in an 
increasing magnitude  2.93  1.33 
SRI leads to lower return on investments 
for the portfolio fund  3.27  0.88 
To increase the proportion of SRI would 
destroy the situation for portfolio managers 3.40  0.83 




Evaluations of the policy measures 
 
As revealed by Table 4, several of the respondents report that they will interpret their 
fiduciary duties differently if the measures were implemented. However, the variation in 
answers is large and the pattern of the answers does not differentiate between the three policy 
measures.   
 
Table 4. Number of respondent who stated that they will interpret their fiduciary duty 
differently if the policy measures were implemented (n=15) 
 
 Measure 
 1  2  3 
 
Very unlikely  2  3  4 
Quite unlikely  1  1   
Neither unlikely nor likely  7  6  4 
Quite likely  3  5  5 
Very likely  2    1 
Did not answer      1 
     
 
For all three measures, the internal work routines in the own organisation would not be 
substantially changed (see Table 5). Because of the small sample size the mean differences 
between the measures are not statistically significant. A measure of effect size d = |M1-M2| 
/SD is instead reported. According to Cohen (1988), 0.25 or less indicate a small, 0.25 a 
medium, 1.0 a medium strong and more than 1.0 is a strong effect size. Consequently, 
measure 1 has been evaluated to have an influence that is medium strong in several respects. 
compared with the other measures.  
 
Table 5. Means (M) and standard deviations (SD) of ratings of influence on the internal work 
routines if the policy measures were implemented (on a scale ranging from very unlikely (1), 
via neither unlikely nor likely (3), to very likely (5)) (n = 15).    10 
  
Measure (M (SD)) 
 
 
Effect size d 
 
 1  2  3  1-2  2-3  1-3 
 
















The dialogue with portfolio 




















Environmental criteria are 











As revealed by Table 6, that the fund will exclude companies with negative environmental 
impact and choose companies that have least negative environmental impact was evaluated as 
highest for measure 1. 
 
Table 6. Means (M) and standard deviations (SD) of the rated probability that the fund will 
use negative and positive screening as a method to incorporate environmental criteria in their 
investments decisions if the measure was implemented (on a scale ranging from very unlikely 




Measure  (M (SD)) 
 
 
Effect size d 
 
  1 2 3  1-2  2-3  1-3 
 
Exclusion of companies with 
negative environmental 



















Choice of company with least 
negative environmental 


















Table 7 reveals that shareholder activities are expected to increase some by measure 1. while 
measure 3 is expected to lead to least change.  
 
 
Table 7 Means (M) and standard deviations (SD) of ratings of change in activities compared 
to current conditions if the policy measures were implemented (on a scale from much more 
rarely (1),  via neither more nor less (3) to much more often (5)), (n=15) 
  
Measure  (M (SD)) 
 
 
Effect size d 
 
  1 2 3  1-2  2-3  1-3 
 






0.48    11 
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A question regarding the amount of resources needed by the fund to be able to act according 
to the suggested measures was rarely answered by the participants. For policy measure 1 a 
few answers were provided that varied between 0.25 and 1 MSEK. Measure 2 had 
assessments varying between 0 and 0.5 MSEK. and the statement “very much”. For measure 3 
there were a few answers of 0 SEK, in addition to the statement 0.5 employees. One 
participant answered “much”. Another estimation of the resources was reported by one 
participant as a one time investment related to programming which should not be followed by 
any recurring costs. In summary, cost differences between the measures were perceived to be 
low, although the participants may have had difficulties in evaluating the costs.  
 
The competence and capacity that is needed should the measures be implemented already 
exists in the fund company. As displayed in Table 8, the measures seem to differ with respect 
to internal or external capacity/competence. Table 9 reveals that for all three measures an 




Table 8. Means (M) and standard deviations (SD) of ratings of competence needed if the 
policy measures were implemented (assessed on a scale ranging from very rarely (1),  via 
neither more nor less (3) to much more often (5)) (n = 15). 
  
Measure (M (SD)) 
 
 
Effect size d 
 
  1 2 3  1-2  2-3  1-3 
 







New internal  2.85 (1.34) 2.69 (1.32) 2.77 (1.09) 0.00  0.09  0.00 
Current external  2.43 (1.65) 2.57 (1.45) 2.79 (1.37) 0.16  0.37  0.32 
New external  2.15 (1.14) 2.23 (1.09) 2.60 (1.33) 0.29  0.44  0.43 
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Table 9. Means (M) and standard deviations (SD) expectation of internal organisation if the 
measure was implemented (assessed on a scale ranging from very rarely (1), via neither more 
nor less (3) to much more often (5)) (n=15). 
  
Measure (M (SD)) 
 
 
Effect size d 
 
  1 2 3  1-2  2-3  1-3 
 







Integrated  3.86 (1.35)  4.00 (1.41)  3.85 (1.07)  0.28  0.07  0.00 
          
 
The most positive attitude was displayed toward policy measure 2 (see Table 10). Some of the 
arguments that may clarify why the evaluations of policy measure 2 was the most positive are 
displayed in Tables 11 and 12. 
 
 
Table 10. Means (M) and standard deviations (SD) of attitudes toward  that the policy 
measures are implemented (on a scale from very negative (1) through neither negative nor 
positive (3) to very positive (5)).  
 
Measure (M (SD)) 
 
 
Effect size d 
 
1  2  3  1-2 2-3 1-3 
        
2.93 (1.10)  3.5 (0.94)  2.50 (0.86)  0.74  0.70  0.45 







Table 11. Means (M) and standard deviations (SD) of benefits for the fund if all companies 
report their environmental impact (rated on a scale ranging from very little benefit (1) to much 
benefit (5)) (n=13). 
    
 M  SD 
 
Creates an overall picture of company  3.31  1.44 
Creates comparison between companies  3.77  2.13 
Environmental impact can be weighed 
with other criteria  3.54  1.27 
Influence companies to develop 
environmentally 3.23  1.24 
Helps to avoid some companies  3.46  1.39 
Helps to avoid bad publication  3.31  1.32 
Increases profitability  2.92  1.44 
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Table 12. Means (M) and standard deviations (SD) of ratings of difficulties for the fund if all 
companies report environmental impact (on a scale ranging from very small difficulties (1) to 
very large difficulties (5)) (n = 14) 
    
 M  SD 
 
Creates an overall picture of company  2.00  0.96 
Creates comparison between companies  2.00  0.96 
Environmental impact can be weighed 
with other criteria  1.93  0.99 






4 Discussion and conclusions 
The portfolio managers held the opinion that there are positive effects of environmental 
reports, both for the environment and for their fund. They estimated the impact to be largest 
for policy measure 1, that is that the fund company must report whether they use 
environmental criteria or not. This is in line with the large impact in UK after that UK 
pensions funds were obliged to take social and environmental consideration into account and 
to disclose their policy about this (Sparkes, 2002). On the other hand, the respondents were 
most positive to policy measure 2, that is that all companies in the stock market must report 
their environmental impact. Policy measure 3, in which the fund companies must report the 
proportion of their portfolio companies that report environmental impact - a proposal with 
vertically integrated environmental reporting - was evaluated not to be useful.  
 
The expected impact from policy measure 1 was both internal and external. Internally, the 
fund companies’ own routines would be affected in several ways according to the 
respondents. For example, the routines for decision and the communication with the portfolio 
companies will be influenced. In addition, there is also the expectation of an increased usage 
of environmental criteria. Policy measure 1 will also lead to a usage of positive and negative 
screening to a higher extent in the choice of companies in which to buy shares. Externally, 
policy measure 1 was evaluated to give the largest effects on shareholder activities for 
example in the execution of buying and selling portfolio companies. On the other hand, 
despite these, the portfolio managers expect the work to be handled by existing internal 
resources.  
 
Despite measure 1 being evaluated to influence impacts and activities most, respondents 
overall evaluated policy measure 2 to be the most positive. The expected benefits of policy 
measure 2 are practical as they will support possibilities to incorporate environmental impact. 
for example that comparable facts will be available from companies. Profitability for the fund 
is estimated to increase slightly by taking environmental reporting from portfolio companies 
into account, even if the profitability increase is not expected to be as strong as the increase in 
practical benefit. The negative aspects of policy measure 2 are considered to be small.  
    14 
Yet another possible explanation of respondents’ positive evaluation of policy measure 2 
may be that this measure renders possibilities to improved information without any own work. 
The other two policy measures involve own work for the portfolio managers while the 
benefits mainly will be improved information for capital owners prepared to invest in funds.  
 
One possible conclusion is that a combination of policy measures 1 and 2 represent a step 
forward. Policy measure 1 was evaluated to give effects in the form of changed routines and 
behaviour in the portfolio companies, while policy measure 2 will give the portfolio managers 
accessibility to facts. The combination can benefit both portfolio managers as well as capital 
owners. This combination of measures is different from policy measure 3, which also aims to 
influence both companies on stock marked and fund companies. Measure 3 received the most 
negative evaluations as it was estimated to require much work for little benefit.  However, 
policy measure 3 represents a vertically integrated proposal. One reason that measure 3 was 
not positively evaluated can be the way the measure was described, another reason that fund 
managers do not appreciate the benefit of information for the other actors they interact with. 
Hence, there is an indication in this study of an agency problem in the relationship between 
capital owners and portfolio managers. Portfolio managers prefer to report to capital owners 
according to measure 1, which is a not standardized system, instead of according to measure 
3, which is both standardized and integrates information vertically. 
 
It is clear that portfolio managers’ believe that institutional investors can be effective tools 
in environmental and social governance. Personal meetings with representatives of portfolio 
companies are regarded as the best way to contribute to sustainability. This is also in line with 
that UK fund managers regard meetings with company management as vital (Barker 1998). 
However, there is a remaining question regarding what may motivate portfolio managers in 
this work, considering their opinion that SRI will lead to lower returns on investments and 
that portfolio managers will have a worse financial outcome if the proportion of SRI is 
increased. One possible cause behind the last statement may be that fund companies can 
benefit from the availability of several different types of funds on the market. Portfolio 
managers benefit from competition. If there are both environmental funds as well as other 
specialised funds, there will be possibilities to differentiate the offers. If all funds should go in 
the same direction, the basis for competition decreases. To strengthen the motivation for SRI 
the driving forces should be strengthened. A first step is clarifying the private financial effects 
of SRI for portfolio managers. One possible way to increase the motivation for SRI can be to 
change the system of bonuses for achievements.   
 
Another risk with the policy measures is that they are inflexible. The transformation in 
society to CSR activities that has occurred to date may be related to work of passionate 
pioneers, in combination with social pressure based on ethical and moral values. The policy 
measures of environmental reporting may result in an administration that is unnecessarily 
heavy, if the reports are not asked for. However, the work for the fund companies if policy 
measures 1 and 2 are implemented seems to be rather limited according to the respondents. In 
addition, several of the funds already practice screening of their portfolio companies. To 
further standardise the information to report may lead to simplification.  
 
Some portfolio managers believe that their fiduciary duty will not be affected by the three 
policy measures, while other had the opposite opinion. Their explanation was that the 
workload would change. It is possible that the respondents in the present study have different 
missions regarding, for instance, the comprehensiveness of their duty. Another explanation 
may be that they have similar fiduciary duties while they interpret them differently. A more    15 
thorough analysis of current fiduciary duties may clarify whether it is the type of missions or 
the interpretation of the missions that lead to some portfolio managers having the opinion that 
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